THE TRIGGER MODEL FOR EVALUATING ACTORNESS

Testing EU actorness and influence in domestic and global governance

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Changes with respect to the DoA

It is the aim of this deliverable to provide an overview on theories and concepts for actorness and effectiveness of the EU in the context of global governance. However, the framework for analysing actorness should not be based on theoretical findings only, but should also be based on empirical findings from case studies. In this way, the conceptual work based on literature reviews will be informed by the empirical analysis in the case studies and vice versa. We learned in the first case study on EU actorness in trade policy, how important this two-way approach is. For example, we discovered interdependencies between the different dimensions of actorness, that need to be reflected in the actorness model.

Secondly, we found that it is useful to align the case studies for developing the model with the topics investigated in the deep dives as each policy area will add additional indicators and framework conditions to the model. We learned from the case study on trade policy, that a closer look into different policy fields helps to further differentiate and specify the actorness model. The topics for the deep dives have now been chosen, so that the work for the smaller case studies can now also begin.

Therefore, this deliverable is considered as a “living document” that will be updated with findings from further case studies, and further develop the actorness model based on the findings on the ontology development. In this way, the document will evolve overtime and present a viable, comprehensive model for actorness, that is based on theoretical as well as empirical findings.

Dissemination and uptake

Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)

Evidence of accomplishment

Report
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1. Introduction

It is the aim of the TRIGGER project to provide European Union’s (EUs) institutions with knowledge and tools to enhance their actorness, effectiveness and influence in global governance. To be able to do so, it is necessary to establish a shared notion of what actorness actually entails, which dimensions define actorness, and how actorness and effectiveness can be measured. Therefore, it is the purpose of the paper to conceptualize actorness to establish a joint understanding of actorness and effectiveness for the project. This conceptualization of actorness forms the foundation for the development of the AGGREGATOR database and the approaches towards the “Deep Dives”, which are in-depth case studies exploring EU actorness and effectiveness in different policy fields.

The role of the EU in global governance has been analysed from many different theoretical perspectives in the academic literature. Various concepts have been used to describe and analyse the EU as an international actor. One perspective is to look at European integration and to analyse the circumstances that lead to a delegation of power and sovereignty to the EU. Agency models describe how and why the Member States (MS) transfer sovereignty to the EU institutions by investigating mechanisms of delegation and control, and the consequences of this delegation (Pollack, 2003; Linder and Foss, 2015; Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017). Others focus on the structural perspective, which concentrates on the framework conditions and external context in which the EU is operating. For example, this includes windows of opportunity resulting from changes in the external environment. This may be of global trends like globalisation, digitalization or others or a change in the global power balance, a change in preferences of other actors in the international arena.

For the purposes of the TRIGGER project, it is necessary to develop an approach towards analysing the EU’s role in global governance that takes into consideration all the dimensions mentioned above: to determine the level of EU actorness and effectiveness, it is necessary to use a model, that:

- Acknowledges differences in EU actorness and effectiveness in different policy fields
- Reflects the influence of the MS on the level of EU actorness
- Takes the external dimensions (relations to other actors in global governance) into consideration
- Allows for the development of indicators and subsequently the measurement of different levels of actorness and effectiveness

The literature on actorness integrates these different dimensions of actorness. In particular, Bretherton and Vogler’s concept of international actorness (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006) broadened the concept considerably by integrating structural perspectives and agency models as well as combining internal and external factors in their actorness model. As they point out it is
“precisely the interconnection between structure and agency which is of interest in a study of the evolving identity, roles and actorness of the EU” (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006, p. 22). As Rhinard and Sjöstedt ((Rhinard and Sjöstedt, 2019) point out, the literature on actorness has also moved from being a rather descriptive approach towards a more analytical model for evaluating the EU’s role in global governance. However, there is no actorness model yet, that is sufficiently differentiated and complex to capture all aspects that influence EU actorness and effectiveness while at the same time not overly complex so that an operationalization is still feasible.

Hence, it is the aim of this paper to propose a model for EU actorness, which reflects both, the agency theory perspective and the structural perspective. This model will lay the groundwork for operationalizing actorness.

The paper starts with a literature review and overview of the different actorness and effectiveness concepts. This literature review will focus on extracting information how the different concepts are used in assessing the EU’s actorness. By comparing and contrasting the different concepts, we aim at developing a set of criteria to determine the EU’s actorness, which are based on the latest scientific findings. This serves as the basis for developing an concept for the AGGREGATOR. The starting point for building this concept is the following framework as a simple causal model for the aggregator:

**Figure 1: Starting Point for TRIGGER Actorness Model**

In a second step, we will point to relevant current trends in global governance, that are likely to change the international settings and thereby influence the EU’s actorness potentials.

Following the in-depth literature analysis, we will refine the first very rough actorness model with the requirements of the TRIGGER project in mind. It is not only the objective of TRIGGER to analyze EU actorness and effectiveness in different policy fields, but also to develop tools, which are useful to harnessing the potentials of foresight activities in complex governance decisions with regard to enhancing EU actorness and effectiveness in the future. Hence, the TRIGGER
model of actorness needs to reflect this objective in its design: the indicators developed have to reflect and allow for changes over time and variations between different policy areas.

Besides the theoretical development of a model for actorness, we also aim at briefly testing the actorness model in a case study to check, whether the dimensions of actorness identified in the literature are relevant and allow for changes and variations in the indicators. This case study is not intended to serve as an in-depth analysis of the chosen policy area – trade policy. Rather it serves as a preparation and testing ground for setting up additional short case studies, which will eventually prepare and add to the deep dives.

In conclusion, we will summarize our findings from the literature and the case studies and use the knowledge from the case study to refine the actorness model derived from the literature. This actorness model will serve as the basis for the next step in the project: defining indicators and possible data sources for evaluating EU actorness in different policy fields.

2. Defining Actorness — A literature Review

The European Union (EU) is capable of both, internally organizing itself internally and taking actions externally in international relations. However, these capabilities have not lead to an agreement in the academic debate, that the European Union can be regarded as a single actor, even less so an agreement which criteria have to be met to constitute actorness. There are a number of different approaches towards defining actorness and many of the criteria are similar or overlap, but there are still a number of distinct concepts and approaches available.

2.1. Actorness as an Academic Concept

Defining and measuring the EU’s actorness has been a scientific endeavor since the EU broadened and extended its competences also in international relations. Most notably Sjöstedt (Sjöstedt, 1977) introduced the concept of actorness in the 1970ies and defined actorness as the “capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system”. This definition entails the following main concepts: autonomy defined in terms of separateness from other actors and internal cohesion or actor capabilities defined in terms of power exertion. This definition is still often referred to. However, the theoretical frameworks for defining actorness have been taken forward and several authors have refined the initial concept of actorness later on. However, there is still no agreed definition of the concept of actorness and several competing views on the EU’s actorness prevail. However, we found many overlaps and similarities between the concepts. This allows us to derive a set of core criteria for defining actorness, which can be used in the TRIGGER model.
2.1.1. Actorness in the literature

Hill (1993, 1998), for example, pointed to the necessary preconditions of being able to agree on a joint stance and the necessary resources and available policy instruments that can be utilized by the EU in its foreign policy. In this way, it links to the observation of Sjöstedt, that **internal cohesion and capabilities** of the EU to take action are the necessary requirements for taking action. This definition of actorness also links to the conclusion of Bretherton and Vogler (2006), that actorness is determined by **opportunities and presence** of the EU in the international system.

Bretherton and Vogler (Bretherton and Vogler, 2000; Vogler and Bretherton, 2006) point to **coherence** as one key factor for the EU’s actorness, which they describe as the level of internal coordination of EU policies. The second main criterion for them is consistency, which refers to the degree of congruence between the external policies of the EU and its MS. This requires a shared commitment to a set of overarching values, but also the availability of policy instruments and the capacity to utilize these instruments, which can be diplomacy, economic tools, and military action.

Cohesion is also a criterion that is emphasized by Jupille and Caporaso (1999), who additionally suggest **autonomy in decision-making processes** as well as **authority** (which they consider a part of autonomy) and the **recognition by others** as relevant factors to determine actorness. Authority refers to the legal basis of EU actions. If actions in a specific policy fall in the competence of the EU only (e.g. trade) the degree of authority is higher than in other areas, where the EU does not have the same legal authorization. Autonomy, in the way Jupille and Caporaso describe it, refers to the available resources to actually enforce this power. However, we could also broaden this view on autonomy and include the capabilities to frame a policy issue so that the EU has the interpretational sovereignty of a policy issue within the EU but also in the international system (see below).

More recently, Klose (2018) pointed out that actorness is a social property, which is made up of the roles performed by constituent units. Hence, he defines actorness as “an entity’s capacity to re-imagine and realize roles for its ‘self’ in (specific contexts of) international affairs” (p. 1145). In order to achieve this, the capacities require an interplay of (social and material) resources, creative action and (domestic and external) role expectations. Again, **cohesion and recognition** seem to be two crucial dimensions of actorness, but also the question, whether there are opportunities for joint action come into focus.

Hence, we can add another dimension, which seems important in determining actorness. Some authors describe this as **“opportunity”**, and describes the developments, trends, and events in the international system, that open up windows of opportunity to act. However, we argue to broaden this dimension and not only to look at the opportunities providing themselves, but also the necessities to act. In this view, this dimensions covers significant advantages of joint action.
(e.g. in trade policy) and external threads (e.g. security policy or climate change). This dimension of actorness is highly dependent on the contexts in which the EU is operating. Therefore, current trends in global governance also influence EU actorness (see chapter 3).

This number of dimensions of EU actorness can be further structured by introducing a distinction between internal and external dimensions of actorness. Kratochvil et al. (Kratochvíl, Cibulková and Beník, 2011) introduce this concept and distinguish between actorness with regard to the internal and external functioning or policy development of the EU and the perception of the EU’s actorness from the inside and the outside:

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<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Perspective From Inside</th>
<th>From outside</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU internal functioning</td>
<td>Legitimate Actor</td>
<td>Attractive Actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU external policies</td>
<td>Framing Actor</td>
<td>Recognized Actor</td>
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**TABLE 1: EU ACTORENSES ACCORDING TO KRATOCHVIL ET AL (2011)**

The differentiation between internal and external dimensions is helpful to better understand and further develop a model of actorness. At the same time, Kratochvil et al. (2013) introduce additional perspectives on actorness, which is in some aspects distinct from the other views on actorness discussed above.

Recognition seems to be a commonly agreed factor, that is important for establishing and maintaining actorness. In addition, Kratochvil and his colleagues also introduce attractiveness as a second external dimension of actorness. It refers to other actors’ perception of the EU in the international arena and their evaluation of the benefits a cooperation with the EU has. This does not only cover the EU's economic and military powers, but also includes other soft power, for example establishing norms and cultural beliefs. It is particularly relevant in the context of European neighborhood policy but also beyond (Rohrbacher and Jenickova, 2013). Secondly, looking at the internal dimension of actorness, Kratochvil and his colleagues describe legitimacy and framing capabilities as the two main characteristics of actorness. According to Koci and Rolenc (Koci and Rolenc, 2013), legitimacy is a complex concept that is broadly discussed in the literature. With regards to actorness, however, we can conclude, that input and throughput legitimacy as one aspect of the overall concept largely overlaps with the above mentioned concept of authority, output legitimacy corresponds with the cohesion dimension, but appears to be broader than cohesion by also including questions of efficiency and raises attention for the perception of the EU by others. Hence, this concept also includes questions of trust and credibility. Framing, on the other hand, refers to the power of the EU to influence and set the international agenda. It describes the EU’s ability to frame and conduct debates and thereby to define the agenda of the EU’s foreign policy (Kratochvíl, Novak and Pojerova, 2013). This dimension, shares overlaps with the dimension “autonomy” and broadens this category by adding the perspective,
that not only the power of the EU to shape discussions and exert power within the EU is relevant, but also the ability to obtain the interpretive sovereignty of an issue within the international system.

### 2.1.2. Distilling relevant factors for TRIGGER

Above, we just sketched out only some of the available approaches towards defining actorness. Even though this is not a complete overview on all available concepts, it becomes evident, that despite the differing approaches towards defining actorness, some features or dimensions of actorness seem to be commonly used. For the purpose of evaluating EU actorness in the context of global governance, it seems useful and justified to differentiate the concept of legitimacy. Hence, we suggest to use the categories authority, autonomy, and cohesion instead of the single dimension legitimacy. However, adding credibility or trust as a fourth category of EU actorness is useful to reflect the perception of the EU and the outputs of EU policy making by the MS and the citizens as well as by other actors in the international regime. This category has not been explicitly referred to in the literature, but results from the discussions around the concept of legitimacy as a dimension of actorness. Therefore, deriving from this literature overview, we can distinguish seven main dimensions of actorness that seem to be most relevant in determining actorness from the point of view of the properties of the EU. The first three dimensions of actorness are describing attributes of the EU itself and they, therefore, cover the internal dimension of actorness:

- **Authority**: This dimension refers to the legal competences that the EU has in a specific policy area. These competences are laid out in the Treaties of the European Union, but may also be complemented by issue specific agreements.

- **Autonomy**: The dimension of "authority" complements the dimension of authority in the sense, that if an actor has the legal rights to act, it is not necessarily able to, if the actor does not have the means to exert power. Hence, this dimension of actorness refers to the resources and capabilities to act. Mostly, this refers to the agenda setting powers of the EU in relation to the MS. In our understanding, it also includes the framing power of the EU to set the international agenda, and to frame and define debates according to the EU’s view of a problem.

- **Cohesion**: In the context of TRIGGER, we will define "cohesion" as a consistent line of argument, meaning that the involved nation states are “speaking with one voice” and share the same policy preferences in a specific policy area.

- **Credibility and Trust**: As a fourth internal dimension of actorness, we add credibility and trust in the EU with regard to its capacities to achieve striven for goals and to be reliable and trustworthy when it comes to agreements. This dimensions does not only have an internal aspect (perception of the EU’s credibility in the MS), but expands to the external dimension as well as it also is crucial that the EU is perceived credible and trustworthy by its counterparts in the international arena.
This shows that it is not possible to examine an actor without looking at the context in which he is operating. Hence, three additional dimensions are relevant when conceptualizing actorness within the AGGREGATOR:

- **Recognition**: For being able to effectively promote its own interests, it is first of all crucial that the EU is recognized as an actor and legitimate negotiation partner by other actors in the international system. Hence, looking at the perception of the EU within the international system is crucial to understanding her role in International Relations.

- **Attractiveness**: Attractiveness goes beyond the recognition of the EU by other actors in the international system and refers to the willingness to cooperate with the EU. It describes how much other actors perceive cooperation with the EU as something worth striving for. It is defined by both, the economic attractiveness of the EU, but also the values and norms or the EU’s soft powers.

- **Opportunity/ necessity to act**: Lastly, the developments and constellations in the international arena one factor that also determines the degree to which the EU can be an actor. This includes both, the options to act when new economic or other opportunities emerge and external threats that may thread peace or the economic and social well-being of the EU and its citizens.

### 2.2. Effectiveness in the Conceptualization of Actorness

As the analysis above has shown, there is a consensus in the literature that the EU is a recognised international actor. Even though, the degree of actorness varies across policy area, specific policy issue and over time, it is possible to define criteria for measuring actorness. However, the criteria mentioned above do not cover the quality of EU actions, which is broadly termed as “effectiveness”. Nevertheless, this is another important aspect of EU actorness, which raise questions and concerns in academia and politics. The EU’s actions are described as effective in some policy areas, whereas in others, only impact or minor effects could be visible. Additionally, it is commonly agreed among researchers that no EU action could be defined as ineffective. Rather, the effectiveness of EU policies could be measured from the lowest degree to the highest. The definitions and the concept of effectiveness vary across different policy areas and disciplines. Hence, this section will first present a brief overview of effectiveness in the literature of different fields and then determine certain comprehensive indicators for effectiveness to be used in our TRIGGER model.

#### 2.2.1. Effectiveness in the literature

The effectiveness of EU policies have been widely discussed in the academic work of the past three decades. Young (1994) introduces six distinct dimensions for the effectiveness of international governance systems in the international environmental regimes: problem solving, goal attainment, behavioural effectiveness, process effectiveness, constitutive effectiveness, and
evaluate effectiveness. Among these, scholars of EU studies continue to build on ‘goal attainment’ and/or ‘problem-solving’ to measure EU effectiveness, see for example i.a. Bretherton and Vogler (Bretherton and Vogler, 2000), Brattberg and Rhinard (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012), Elsig (Elsig, 2013), Groen and Niemann (Groen and Niemann, 2013), Niemann and Bretherton (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013), van Schaik (van Schaik, 2013), Groen et al (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür, 2013), Delreux (Delreux, 2014), Parker et al (Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe, 2017), Blavoukos and Bourantonis (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2017), and Oberthür and Groen (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). On the one hand, goal attainment is perceived as a measure of the extent to which a regime’s stated or unstated goals are attained over time and, on the other hand, problem solving is understood as whether the policies and actions operate to solve the problems that they were meant to resolve.

Depending on the topics and the field of study, researchers added further explanatory variables for goal attainment and problem solving. For instance, in their study on the EU’s effectiveness at Copenhagen climate negotiations, Groen and Niemann (2013) show the necessity of considering external and internal dimensions for goal attainment. They therefore added two criteria: opportunity and capability. They describe opportunity as the “external environment or context that enables or constrains EU action” and capability as the “internal factors affecting the EU’s ability to capitalise on presence and respond to opportunity”. Elsig (2013) studies the effectiveness of the EU in the World Trade Organisation. The study distinguishes between effectiveness in representation and effectiveness in impact. Van Schaik (2013) studies the relations between actorness and effectiveness of the EU in negotiations on international food standards in Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). For this author, actorness is the result of EU competence, preference homogeneity and processes of socialisation among the MS, while effectiveness is primarily seen as goal attainment. Edwards (Edwards, 2013) peruses the effectiveness of the role of the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service based on four inter-related elements, such as building capacity, appropriate policy instrument, political framework and legitimacy.

On a different note, da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014) published a collection of journal articles to investigate the relations between internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the European Union. The journal articles that cover a broad range of policy areas are aiming at explaining the extent to which internal cohesiveness can result in external effectiveness and whether more cohesiveness results in more effectiveness. They study effectiveness by some actorness dimensions, like external and internal cohesiveness, authority, autonomy, and recognition. This collection of academic work, however, does not measure EU effectiveness based on goal attainment and problem solving, but instead describes effectiveness as the ability to influence outcomes, with bargaining configuration and policy arena as the intervening variables. Bargaining configuration is often followed by a ‘who’ question, which means that the entity that the EU is negotiating with conditions the level of external effectiveness,
particularly the bargaining strategies, relative power and negotiating position of the other players. The policy arena questioned by ‘what’ refers to the characteristics of the policy area and the issue complexity, which could also intervene in the EU’s ability to act as an effective actor on the world stage.

Additionally, Oberthür & Groen (2018) develop a model for explaining the EU “goal achievement” (effectiveness) in the international negotiations. They suggest four categories of factors to explain effectiveness. These factors include (i) the international context which looks into the power and international constellation of interests (ii) the process of international negotiations (iii) internal EU politics e.g. internal interests, unity and domestic legislations and (iv) negotiation strategies and diplomacy. In a later work, Groen (Groen, no date) tests this model on the Convention on Biological Diversity and she insists particularly on the importance of diplomatic engagement, issue specific bargaining power and constellations of interest.

Moreover, Peters (2016) states that effectiveness is the measure for the quality of a given policy, such as performance and success, and should be operationalised in a way that allows a differentiated measurement. An actor remains an actor, even if it may not be effective, and the quality of actorness, in essence, is the independent variable for effectiveness. He further suggests three dimensions for the evaluation of EU policy effectiveness, parallel to the steps of a policy cycle model. These are output effectiveness, outcome effectiveness, and impact effectiveness.

To conclude, the primary researchers of EU effectiveness study the topic based on goal attainment and problem solving logics. They use actorness indicators such as cohesion, authority, autonomy and recognition to explain effectiveness. Later, other group of researchers argue that policy effectiveness is not only achieving goals and solving problems, but also being able to influence the outcomes. For this, they use actorness indicators with some additional intervening variables. Finally, other group of researchers simplified the issue by using actorness dimensions as an independent variable for effectiveness and suggested that based on the given policy area, additional intervening variables could be added. This last statement will be our point of departure to conceptualise effectiveness in the TRIGGER model.

2.2.2. Distilling relevant factors for TRIGGER

The literature presented above does not show a consensus in the definition and concepts of effectiveness across different EU policy areas. However, there is a huge overlap and similarities in the yardsticks used to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU policies that could help us to establish certain criteria to conceptualise effectiveness for our TRIGGER model. We use the model developed by Peters (Peters, 2015), which is based on an improved version of Underdal & Young’s (Underdal and Young, 2013) work on effectiveness. In line with Peters, here actorness with all its components mentioned in the previous section is considered as an independent variable for effectiveness.
In the TRIGGER model for actorness and effectiveness, we consider effectiveness as the outcome of an EU external action that solved a problem, attained a stated or non-stated goal or had a minimum influence on the target. Additionally, the quality of action and actorness itself is considered as the independent variable for effectiveness with additional auxiliary variables from the work of previous scholars to make the model more comprehensive and employable in different policy areas. The auxiliary variables could be added based on the modality of policies to first of all evaluate and then measure the given EU action. Here are some formerly introduced variables that could be used as auxiliary variables in our model for TRIGGER:

- **Constellation of interests**: EU's main objective(s) in the international negotiations e.g. it could be conservative, reformist, demandeur, extreme or moderate objectives.
- **Policy arena**: setup of the stage based on the characteristics of the policy area and the complexity of the issues. For example, overlap across bilateral and multilateral agreements, conflicts and confusions in the international and bilateral obligations, etc.
- **Bargaining configuration**: use of resources and tools to support its agenda e.g. technical and financial resources, etc.
- **Diplomatic engagement**: reaching out to third parties, communication, signalling preferences, building coalitions, and bringing forward sensible compromise proposals.

With the help of these variables, the researchers will be able to examine the effectiveness of EU actions in the international arena.

### 2.3. Summary and Implications for TRIGGER

From the literature review we can conclude that actorness and effectiveness are mostly defined qualitatively and not in quantitative terms. Hence, it will be a task for TRIGGER to define indicators and to identify suitable data sets to operationalize both concepts to be able to model them in the AGGREGATOR.

As a starting point for the analysis of indicators and data sets, we broke down the elements that constitute actorness and effectiveness according to the literature. Even though there are different approaches towards defining both concepts, and there is no commonly agreed definition of neither actorness nor effectiveness, it is possible to identify most commonly used concepts and approaches. Regarding actorness these are:

- Authority
- Autonomy
- Cohesion
- Trust/ Credibility
- Recognition
- Attractiveness
• Opportunity to act (shifts and trends in global governance) or the necessity to act (external threads)

If we distinguish between the internal and external dimension of these properties, we get the following matrix for describing the actorness dimension:

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<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Actorness</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Competence</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Relations</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Attractiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Opportunity/ Necessity to act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Credibility/ Trust</td>
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**TABLE 2: DIMENSIONS OF ACTORNESS**

However, just considering the dimension of actorness is not sufficient to get a holistic overview on the role of the EU in global governance. Instead, we also need to take into account the effectiveness of EU actions, meaning the ability to enforce the EU's positions and to prevail against other actors in the international system. From the literature, we found that the following dimensions of effectiveness are relevant:

- Constellation of Interest
- Bargaining constellation
- Policy Arena
- Diplomatic engagement

These complement the dimensions of actorness and refine some of the actorness dimensions by suggesting to qualify the results of the analysis of actorness. As Peters (2016) has suggested, an actor remains an actor regardless his or her effectiveness. The quality of this actorness determines its effectiveness. Hence, the suggested dimensions for effectiveness can be integrated in our model for effectiveness. For example, the effectiveness dimension of the “policy arena” corresponds with the opportunities/necessities to act”, the “bargaining constellation” in the concept of effectiveness relates to the category “autonomy”, and the “constellation of interest” is reflected in the “cohesion” dimension of the actorness concept. If we add these dimensions to the matrix, we get a more differentiated picture of dimensions or variables, that constitute an effective actor in the international arena:
3. Current Trends in Global Governance

The multitude of regimes, tools and approaches in global governance sets the scene in which the EU engages in international relations and politics. It influences the EU’s ability to shape global affairs and determines its actorness potential and effectiveness within international political and cooperation settings. Developments, trends and events in global governance form opportunity structures and create constraints that enable, require or disable the EU to act.

Global governance does yet not only form the independent variable when it comes to analyzing the EU’s actorness and effectiveness in international relations. As dependent variable, global governance is shaped by the EU’s ability and effectiveness to engage in and influence global politics; as intervening variable, global governance and politics affect the EU’s external dimensions and some of its internal ones, such as cohesion. In this multidimensional understanding, global governance provides the backdrop, the target and the momentum for EU actorness and effectiveness internally and externally.

In order to assess the multidimensional impact of global governance on the EU’s ability to act effectively abroad properly, the state of global governance needs to be diagnosed. For this diagnosis, apart from current political trends, also general definitions of (global) governance and issues of measuring it need to be discussed.

The extension of political problem-solving arenas beyond national borders and the rescaling of the political space beyond the national sphere (Rosenboim, 2019) characterize an era in which problems spread beyond national borders and in which global governance structures are essential means to provide political solutions. The original governance concept reflects this impact of globalisation and regionalisation on the extension of political structures and arenas beyond the nation state (Benz, 2004; Peters 2002:3; Zumbansen, 2012). Like in the case of the

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Dimensions of EU Actorness and Effectiveness</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Competence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power Relations</td>
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**TABLE 3: DIMENSIONS OF ACTORNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS**
EU, it grasped the complexity of multilevel, multilayered and multitiered political patterns (Umbach, 2009:45f.) that characterize transnational and global governance. In addition, good governance (Agullera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Andrews, 2008; Doornbos, 2001; Grindle, 2004 and 2007; Rotberg, 2014; Rothstein, 2012; Weiss 2000) is perceived around the world as the key ingredients for accountable political performance, efficient public affairs and transparent organisation of political power-citizen relations. It, thus, forms the basis for transparent politics based on accountable administrations, sustainable regulation, high capacity levels and low levels of corruption. With this focus on structural and procedural realities of polycentric politics (Peterson, 2003:18) in regional and global contexts, the governance concepts focusses on key features of contemporary statehood and multilevel political interrelations in global governance arrangements. In this understanding, global governance structures are a consequence of globalisation of politics that impact on nation states, regional and local political actors, and international political contexts alike (Rosamond, 2000). Decoupling of politics from national contexts goes hand-in-hand with new, no longer territorially bound forms of political problem-solving, which result in the functional and no longer territorial construction of political space (Knodt, 2004). As a consequence scholars observe the expansion of political processes across political levels; the interdependence of decision-making at different levels; the multiplication of access points to decision-making; the increased number of relevant state and non-state actors; the interlinking of supranational and intergovernmental governance modes; as well as cross-level intra- and intergovernmental network relations, coordination, and negotiation (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004; Peters 2012; Schmitter 2004).

With its profound emphasis on interlinkages and interrelatedness, the global governance perspective contests the international relations’ perspective on nation states as the key problem-solving units within an anarchical international system. Its central narrative pays tribute to essential trends that followed the collapse of the bipolar international system and resulted in the emergence of a multipolar or multilateral world order. It highlights interlinked structures of political authority and interaction as well as cooperation between governments, public administrations, and transnational societal actors in circumstances, in which a superior sovereign level is missing. As a result, global governance originates in and manifests the transformation of the political space beyond the interaction of nation states including civil societies’ worldwide activities. It embraces transnational neopluralism of social movements and organisations, private-public networks and multi-stakeholder interactions, private authority within a global system of formal and informal institutions of inter- and transnational rule-setting resulting a differentiated, fragmented and multimodal global governance architecture (Long, 2015; Pankakoski and Vihma, 2017).

As such, global governance has become a central perspective on world politics. It grasps essential transformative trends such as global policy-making at different levels of the international system; the emergence of international and regional public and private orders and the fragmentation of power through new forms of political steering or social norms as well as
sovereignty; and decision-making competences and authority at the global level. Yet, global governance is also charged with intangible aspects and normative interpretations (Finkelstein, 1995; Fukuyama, 2013; Grindle, 2007; Pierre and Peters, 2005). It frames debates and political action on global problems that are meant to balance outcomes of globalisation, such as the participation in wealth or human well-being. With this normative impact, it lays the ground for common global rules, ethics, norms, values, paradigms, standards. In such a way, one of the main goals of governance at the global level is to regain control over globalised political and social interactions that otherwise remain potentially unregulated as they are out of the reach of nation states’ control (Weiss, 2000; Doornbos, 2001; Murphy, 2000). Reflections on the provision of global public goods, the development of global paradigms such as Sustainable Development or the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ within UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), are cases in point for such normative impact.

In parallel to the acknowledgement of these paradigmatic powers of global governance, the contestation of global governance solutions and the renationalisation of politics is a contemporary trend witnessed with concern around the world. This trend not only jeopardises existing political arrangements that have been agreed upon to govern joint challenges on a planetary scale. It confronts global politics with the problem of rendering the benefits of the widespread, multilevel, complex, yet essential network of global governance structures clearly visible to reveal the vital interconnectedness they provide for organising world affairs. To properly assess global governance solutions for regulating global problems, their benefits for the organisation of global politics must constantly be evaluated (Giebler, 2012). Yet, while featuring prominently within the political and academic debate since the 1990s, measuring global governance represents a difficult endeavour as one must constantly pay tribute to the complexity of the over-conceptualised, yet incoherently defined concept of global governance (Doornbos, 2001; Holt and Manning 2014).

Any starting point for measuring global governance must be honest reflections on what possibly can be measured, what practically is measured, and what problematically lays beyond the boundaries of governance measurement tools. Global governance is a multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon of global political and institutional practice. It is not measurable per se and hence requires sometimes very complex aggregations of indicators and statistical data to capture its characteristics. Its measurement requires context to understand its impact and flaws and reflections on aggregations are open to contestation as they are constructed approximations to reality that measure and frame reality at the same time (Bovaird and Löffler, 2003).

Concrete measures of global governance always reflect the political, institutional, legal, cultural, social, and geographical contexts from which they stem and are applied. Their conceptual nature varies according to their purpose, usage, and developers. Their adaptability make governance measurement a popular, yet contested instrument of global, regional, national, and local reach.
Such contestation is even magnified as governance measures are required to perform in most different systemic contexts for very diverse actor groups even if the instruments themselves remain targeted on evaluating political structures and processes no matter if they are used for rankings, ratings, reforms, advocacy or research. Such required fitness for multi-purpose applicability creates challenges not only for designing governance measures, but also for the reform of governance systems they evaluate. Assuming, however, that governance measures could be defined homogenously, would fall victim to the mistake of creating ‘clinical’ measures detached from real world context.

Compared to the broad variety of governance and good governance measures, the ecosystem of global governance measurement is still un(der)inhabited and in its conceptualisation phase. Some approaches propose to differentiate global governance structures by their level of fragmentation, analysing their degree of ‘institutional integration’, ‘norm conflicts’ involved, and related ‘actor constellations’. Different forms of ‘global governance architectures’ are differentiated ranging from ‘conflictive fragmentation’ over ‘cooperative fragmentation’ towards ‘synergistic fragmentation’ (Biermann et al. 2009). Moreover, interesting approaches are offered in measuring different degrees of global governance performance identified around the interrelated characteristics of speed, ambition, participation, and equity. As within the debate about governance indicators, any future conceptualisation of global governance metrics however also needs to focus on the development of actionable, practical, and concrete measures that can be contextualised and transferred to different levels of global political interaction in order to shape common understandings for the intrinsic value of global governance.

It is through robust and rigorous evaluation of global governance arrangements that their value for the collective regulation at global level helps frame the leeway for EU actorness and effectiveness to influence the rules-based delivery of public goods and for the protection of global commons at international level. In times in which contestation has become a frequent reflex in politics, taking stock and assessing global governance and the EU’s role in it remains essential for generating knowledge on why global governance matters and on how global politics can be influenced by the EU to best impact on world affairs.

4. Modelling Actorness

A model for actorness reflects the different dimensions of actorness, the preconditions for effectiveness, and considers the opportunities and challenges that result from the current trends and likely future developments in global governance. As a starting point, we used a simple model of actorness (see chapter 1), that reflects current trends, and opportunities, but does not visualize the different dimensions of actorness yet, which we found in the literature.
However, a more detailed picture of the factors is necessary to understand the drivers and challenges, that enable EU actorness and effectiveness, and allow for a differentiated picture of the internal settings within different policy areas.

The following figure summarizes the findings from the literature review in a more detailed model of EU actorness:

![Figure 2: TRIGGER Model for Actorness](image)

In this model we integrated the internal and external dimensions of actorness and effectiveness and linked them to the processes beyond the EU to show, how the factors influencing the EU’s role as an actor affect trends global governance and vice versa. This model for actorness is based on theoretical observations and conclusions from case studies in the academic literature. However, it is the aim of the TRIGGER project to go beyond (theoretical) descriptions of actorness, but to develop an analytical approach for measuring and evaluating actorness and effectiveness. It is therefore necessary to test this model to ensure, that the theoretical conceptualization of actorness is a useful tool for empirically analysing and testing EU actorness in different policy fields, and to refine the model based on empirical findings if necessary.

5. Testing the Actorness Model

5.1. Research Protocol

In order to show the relevance of the factors, which determine actorness, we will test whether the model for actorness shown above adequately represents the actorness concept. This will help us
to determine, whether it is useful as a basis for more complex and detailed future analysis of European actorness in the policy areas of the deep dives. Moreover, we aim to demonstrate in the case study that the degree of actorness can vary over time within a policy area. As a test case we have chosen the policy area “trade policy”. There is a broad consensus, that trade policy is an area, in which the EU has a high degree of actorness. Hence, it is not the aim of this case study to determine whether the EU can be considered an (effective) actor in trade policy. Instead, we will describe each of the determinants of actorness identified in the literature and show how these materialize in trade policy. In this way we aim to test the TRIGGER concept for actorness and the model we have introduced, and to prepare the more detailed analyses of the different dimensions of actorness in the upcoming additional case studies and Deep Dives.

For this purpose, we conducted a literature review of relevant academic literature and looked at the important legal documents and policy papers in trade. However, we did not gather primary data. more detailed analyses of the EU’s actorness in different policy areas will be conducted in the Deep Dives later on in the project.

The case study shows, that many of the dimensions of actorness are not easily distinguishable in all cases. Nevertheless, we will point out what aspects the different dimensions of actorness entail, how they relate to each other, and how they change over time.

5.2. Case Study: The EU and Trade Policy

In our globalized world, international trade is a relevant policy field. In case of the EU, trade policy covers the trade in goods and services, foreign direct investment, commercial aspects of intellectual property, such as patents, and public procurement. On the one hand, this includes trade regulations aimed at protecting consumers and producers from unfair or unsafe products, processes, and competition. On the other hand, EU trade policy entails opening up new markets and increasing trade opportunities with non-EU-countries, for example through trade agreements.

To verify our model of EU actorness, we look at the EU trade policy from the perspective of actorness in the context of global governance. As this is only supposed to give a brief overview on trade policy, we will focus primarily on the EU’s competencies concerning negotiating and implementing trade agreements.

5.2.1. The Internal Dimension

5.2.1.1 Authority to act - The legal basis

International trade was one of the first sectors in which MS agreed to pool their sovereignty. The EU has the centralized trade authority at EU level and external trade policy has been exclusive EU competence since the Treaty of Rome was effective from 1958 onwards and has been negotiating trade agreements since the 1970ies (Woolcock, 2008; Puccio, 2016). This means,
the EU has exclusive competencies EU trade policy. Therefore, the MS do not have the legal authority to introduce their own legislation apart from legislation implementing trade policies within the framework of the EU’s legislative initiatives. This is established in Article 3 AEU Treaty and Article 206-207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Furthermore, Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy) specify EU trade policy making arrangements.

Legislation in trade and investment related areas is adopted following the regular legislative procedure. This means, the European Commission is leading negotiations on trade agreements after the Council gives a mandate to the Commission to start a negotiation process. Besides the approval of the European Parliament, a qualified majority vote in the Council is necessary to pass legislation (although the Council typically tries to reach a consensus). Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the role of the European Parliament has been strengthened in the process. The Parliament is now the co-legislator on matters involving trade and investment with equal rights like the Council.

This extensive authority of the EU institutions in matters regarding trade and investment gave the European institutions great autonomy to act as well. However, it is important to distinguish different types of trade agreements. Whenever a trade agreement does not only cover matters related to trade and investment only but also matters that fall into the competences at MS level it is considered a “mixed agreement”. In that case the MS themselves need to sign the agreement, not just the EU as their representative. For example, questions regarding human rights, environmental protection or labour rights are not exclusive EU competencies especially the EU parliament often argues that these should be included in trade agreements. Therefore, trade agreements covering aspects like this, have to be treated as mixed agreements (Gstöhl, 2011; Gstöhl and Hanf, 2014; Weiß, 2014).

Moreover, for the elements of a mixed agreement that fall outside exclusive competencies of the EU institutions, the European Parliament loses its amendment powers, but usually retains an overall veto via the Special Legislative Procedures laid down in the treaties for the scrutiny of EU foreign relations (Gstöhl, 2011; Richard E Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2012).

In sum, the different types of trade agreements are:

- Customs Unions
- eliminate customs duties in bilateral trade
- establish a joint customs tariff for foreign importers.
- Association Agreements, Stabilisation Agreements, (Deep and Comprehensive) Free Trade Agreements and Economic Partnership Agreements
  - remove or reduce customs tariffs in bilateral trade.
- Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
  - provide a general framework for bilateral economic relations
  - leave customs tariffs as they are

### 5.2.1.1.2 Implications for measuring “authority”

#### 5.2.1.1.2.1 Changes over time

In the case of the legal basis, changes over time are rather few. This is not only true in the case of trade policies but applies to all policy areas. A shift of EU competences requires a change of the EU Treaties in most cases. The last major change concerning the legal basis for EU trade policies was the signing of the Lisbon treaty, giving the European Parliament a bigger role in the process among other changes ([Woolcock, 2008; Gstöhl, 2011](#)).

Moreover, we can observe changes over time 1) with regard to the interpretation of the regulations in place and 2) with the nature and set-up of trade agreements and resulting from this, the legal basis that applies.

Regarding the latter, we observe, that trade negotiations are becoming increasingly complex in the past decades. This leads to trade agreements that often cover aspects extending beyond custom unions, for example. Instead, they increasingly cover aspects of economic partnership agreements like investment policies, for example.

Even though trade has always been an exclusive competence of the EU, the range of issues that fall under that competence has evolved over time. Originally intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment have not been part of EU competences. The Lisbon Treaty now includes all services and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and foreign direct investments on the list of competences of the EU (Art. 207(1) TFEU). However, the conclusion of the European Commission to be able to conclude all trade agreements that purely focus on commercial matters is contested within the MS, who are convinced that these agreements have to be treated as mixed agreements. In particular, the question which types of investments fall under exclusive EU competencies. While the European Council argues that portfolio investments remain a competence of the MS, the European Commission interprets the regulations differently ([Puccio, 2016](#)).

#### 5.2.1.1.2.2 Relation to the other dimensions of actoriness

In addition, even though the Council can theoretically adopt trade agreements negotiated by the Commission by qualified majority, all involved parties still opt for solutions that all members agree on. However, this interpretation of the legal framework is closely related to the dimensions “cohesion”, and “credibility/trust”. 

Secondly, we also observed, that the MS increasingly demand to be more closely involved in the decision-making process of negotiating trade agreements. The negotiation process for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US and the European-Canadian Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are probably the most prominent examples. This leads to a stronger advocacy for treating trade agreements as mixed agreements to give the MS parliaments a stronger voice in the negotiation process. However, this shift in the interpretation of trade agreements relates closely to other actorness dimensions as well, for example “autonomy”, “cohesion”, and “trust”.

A degree of authority may also influence the external dimension of EU actorness. If, like in the case of trade policy, the EU has the legal competence to act on behalf of the MS, the level of recognition is likely to be higher as other actors have no other choice than to cooperate with the EU.

5.2.1.2 Autonomy to Act

5.2.1.2.1 The current status

The extensive legal basis determining the EU’s legal authority to act also gives it great autonomy to act compared to other policy areas. In theory, the Commission can negotiate and conclude trade agreements with support from a qualified majority in the Council and the European Parliament. The importance and autonomy of the EU as an actor in trade policy is also reflected in the EU being an individual member of the World Trade organization (WTO) since 1995, even though also the MS each are members as well. While the EU is a full member of the WTO, it does not have the same access to other international organizations. This is partly the case, because many international organizations do not allow other international organisations to become members as their constitutions only allow for nation states’ membership. At the same time, studies have shown, that, despite frequent statements from the EU about its aspirations to play a more significant role within the international financial organizations, the EU plays a rather limited role in the significant organisations in that policy area. Neither in the case of the IMF nor the World Bank, the MS seem to find it necessary to widen the role of the EU in these organisations. This holds true even after the financial crisis of 2008 (Jørgensen and Wessel, 2011).

Also, some elements of trade agreements may remain within the remit of the MS, which may limit the EU’s autonomy to act. In these cases, the European Commission will still lead the negotiations, but the conclusion and ratification depends on the agreement of all MS. Therefore, the EU’s autonomy is more limited in these cases. As trade agreements tend to cover more and more issue areas and became more and more complex, all recently adopted trade agreements have been mixed agreements. The example of the TTIP and CETA negotiations showed, that there may be disputes whether certain aspects of trade negotiations fall under the competencies of the EU. In particular, the regulations on foreign investments and Investor-State Dispute Settlement have been highly contested. The European Commission’s point of view was that these
agreements fall under the exclusive competence of the EU as they only cover trade and investment related issues. This would require only the European Parliament and the Council to agree to the new contract with qualified majority. A ratification process in each MS would not be necessary in that case.

However, in both cases, TTIP and CETA, the European Commission was not able to enforce this view, and both agreements were treated as mixed agreements leading to a significantly higher influence of the MS on the ratification process. In the case of the EU-Japan Trade Agreement (Economic Partnership Agreement – EPA), this conflict did not occur as the EPA was negotiated independently from the Strategic Partnership Agreement, that had to be agreed and ratified by all MS. In this way, it was possible to exclude critical issues like portfolio investments or international arbitration courts and to treat these in the separate Strategic Partnership Agreement.

In general, EU negotiators are usually “held on a tight leash” (De Bièvre, 2018, p. 72) by the MS, who ultimately will have to ratify the agreement and need to take into account their respective domestic interest groups into account. “As a result, EU negotiators have less negotiation autonomy yet larger bargaining power than negotiators from third countries, a phenomenon known as ‘the paradox of weakness’.” (De Bièvre, 2018, p. 72). Hence, despite the legal authority of the EU in trade policy issues, this does not necessarily grant it an extensive autonomy to act.

5.2.1.2.2 Implications for measuring “autonomy”

5.2.1.2.2.1 Changes over time

De Biévre (2018) observed, that the autonomy of the Commission has always been limited as it is dependent on the agreement of the MS in the Council. We can observe, that over time, this autonomy has developed twofold: On the one hand, the EU became a member of the WTO, which gives the EU a stronger voice in international trade policy. On the other hand, the autonomy of the EU institutions has been questioned in recent cases of trade negotiations and the MS’ parliaments demand a bigger role in trade policies.

It has to be investigated further if this is a general trend for all European policy initiatives, a trend in trade policy as their nature becomes increasingly complex, or a phenomenon that occurred only under the specific circumstances of the recent trade negotiations (TTIP, CETA) and their contents.

Changes over time can furthermore result from a new perception of the role of the Commission and the EU once changes. This may be the case when there are changes in EU membership. Brexit is the next upcoming change in this regard, but also possible future EU enlargement roles may change the attitude of the MS with regard to the autonomy the Commission will get for negotiating trade agreements.
5.2.1.2.2 Relation to the other dimensions of actorness

However, a possible change in the willingness to grant the Commission more (or less) autonomy to is likely to depend on the degree of cohesion between the MS regarding the goals of future trade policies and the amount of trust they are willing to give the Commission. Hence, the dimension is not entirely distinct from the other dimensions of actorness, especially the amount of cohesion and trust is relevant to the future development of this dimension of actorness.

With regard to the external dimension of actorness, autonomy of the EU is likely to have an effect on the dimension of recognition as well. If the EU is visible, for example through an own seat in international organisations, it is likely that levels of recognition also improve. Likewise, if the Commission has great autonomy to act in negotiations, it is less likely that negotiation partners additionally approach individual MS.

5.2.1.3 Cohesion

5.2.1.3.1 The current status

The EU as a whole is an important economic zone, also in the world economy. Despite combining just 6.9% of the world’s population, the EU trade with the rest of the world accounts for more than 15% of global imports and exports (EC, no date). This makes the EU one of the three largest global trade players next to the US and China. The MS agree that the EU as a single actor in trade policy has more power in world politics than the MS alone, which is why they provided the EU with the extensive legal authority in trade and investment matters that it has today (Gstöhl, 2011; De Bièvre, 2018).

In the strategy “Trade for all – Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy”, which was adopted in 2015, the European Institutions and the MS lay down their joint understanding and priorities for European trade policies to establish a coherent basis for future activities in the field. The strategy states the commitment of the EU to its core values and affirms that EU trade policy is one means to promote European values (EC, 2015). It reflects a growing scepticism if globalisation and international free trade are still the ultimate goals to strive for. As a result, the strategy addresses many of the criticisms and focuses on making trade policy more value-driven, transparent and effective (Titievskaja and Harte, 2019). Despite the necessity for a new orientation of the underlying justifications for the EU’s trade policy, there seems to be an overall consensus in the MS that closing off markets from the world is not a way forward. Hence, there seems to be a rather high degree of cohesion regarding the overall goals and policy priorities in the context of trade policy between the MS.

Also, the reactions to recent attempts of US president Trump suggesting individual trade agreements to some MS showed, that there is no doubt within the MS that the Commission is the only actor, who is authorized to negotiate trade policies (Sheth, no date). This shows that there is a general joint understanding that the EU is the relevant actor, which negotiates trade related
issues. Therefore, there is cohesion regarding the overall understanding of the EU’s role in trade policy.

However, when it comes to specific questions and contents of a trade agreement, the MS and Commission do not always share the same preferences. This became particularly visible in the negotiation processes of TTIP and CETA (Rudloff and Lauer, 2016; Rudloff, 2017).

Not only the differences between the preferences of the MS became visible. Also within society the debates about the benefits and costs of globalisation and the role of the EU in this context were extensively discussed. (Rudloff, 2017). Especially, in the light of the increasing demand for a sustainability transformation, discussions flourish how a sustainable society looks like, how it can be achieved, and what causes the currently unsustainable patterns of society and economy. This also causes a vivid debate which role international trade and globalization play in this context. As many groups within society feared that current priorities in trade agreements do not align with the demands for more environmentally and socially sustainable practices, resistance in society towards grows. It leads to a divide between advocates of further liberalisation of markets and the sceptics towards this approach. This also puts higher pressure on decision-makers on EU level, who have to represent the interests of the MS.

This divide was reflected in the backlash the Commission faced from Civil Society in the negotiation process of TTIP and CETA (Eliasson, 2015; Adriaensen et al., 2017; Rudloff, 2017; De Bièvre, 2018; Eliasson and Huet, 2018; Rone, 2018). And, in the case of CETA, the Wallonian parliament showed, that diverging interests even diverging interests of single actors could derail and ultimately quash a trade agreement that has been negotiated for years (Kleimann and Kübek, 2018).

5.2.1.3.2 Implications for measuring “cohesion”

5.2.1.3.2.1 Changes over time

It is likely that not only the general societal evaluation of the costs and benefits of international trade change over time and, therefore influence the level of cohesion. While TTIP and CETA were heavily scrutinized by civil society and by the media, the EU-Japan trade agreement and partnership agreement were not subject to the same amount of backlash from the media, and also protests from civil society did not reach the same extend as against TTIP and CETA even though the agreements cover similar issues.

5.2.1.3.2.2 Relations to other dimensions of actorness

As shown previously the degree of cohesion (and also trust) can highly influence other dimensions of actorness. Whereas the legal basis of the EU’s actions is not easily changed, their interpretation and the autonomy for EU institutions to act resulting from this interpretation depend on the joint understanding of these roles and common goals to achieve jointly.
Hence, the other internal dimensions of actorness are influenced by the degree of cohesion of the MS and society. In addition, the external dimension of actorness may be influenced.

5.2.2. Credibility and Trust

5.2.2.1 The current status

The recent societal discussions on trade agreements showed, that not only the content of the agreements was under scrutiny in the MS. Especially, NGOs criticized the negotiation process itself (Eliasson, 2015; Adriaensen et al., 2017; Rudloff, 2017; De Bièvre, 2018; Eliasson and Huet, 2018; Rone, 2018). Also, politicians demanded that such complex trade agreements should be treated as mixed agreements regardless whether they would actually fall into EU competency alone. They requested a veto power for the EU MS as they feared that an agreement negotiated by the EU would not meet the expectations of the majorities within the MS. This critique was not based on legal arguments only (BMWi, 2016; Ratz, 2017; Kleimann and Kübek, 2018). Instead, the critics framed their request for more influence of the MS parliaments as a question of democratic legitimacy. In this way they also questioned the legitimacy of the EU institutions and expressed concerns, that the EU institutions and decision-making processes, which provide for extensive influence of the MS in the Council, is not sufficient. Hence, we can conclude, that there was a lack of trust in the decision-making processes in the EU institutions.

In the case of TTIP and CETA, both agreements were treated as mixed agreements. In the case of CETA, for example, this resulted from including also portfolio investments, which are not part of the EU’s competencies in the view of the European Council. Even though the European Commission claimed that the trade agreement with Canada should not be treated as a mixed agreement, the interpretation prevailed, that the MS have to be involved in the decision-making process (Ratz, 2017). Hence, the European Commission still had the competence to negotiate the details of the agreement. However, as a ratification of the final agreement by all MS (and in some cases regional parliaments) was necessary, the autonomy of the EU in the negotiation process was more limited than it is for EU-only agreements. While the negotiations for TTIP are currently on hold, the EU and the MS ratified CETA and it is in force. However, the agreement was on the brink of a precipice for a while, as the Wallonian parliament (Kleimann and Kübek, 2018), one of the regional parliaments that had to approve of the negotiated treaty, had significant doubts regarding the contents of CETA.

5.2.2.2 Implications for measuring “trust and credibility”

5.2.2.2.1 Changes over time

Even though de Bièvre (2018) argued that the EU has always been “held on a tight leash” (p. 72) by the MS and an agreement of the MS governments to the negotiated treaties is necessary in the Council, there seems to be an increasing lack of trust concerning the consideration of the interests of all involved stakeholder groups and MS.
5.2.2.2 Relation to the other dimensions of actorness

One reason for this increasing lack of trust may be the fact that trade negotiations have become increasingly complex and touch upon almost all aspects of society. Hence, even broader groups of society are affected. At the same time, there is no broad societal consensus (anymore) that free trade in our current neo-liberal, globalized, capitalist economy is the way forward to achieve a desirable future. Therefore, the lack of trust may partly result from a lack in cohesion with regard to the diverging visions for the future, and partly from the observed growing inequalities within societies and among the MS (see chapter on cohesion).

5.2.3. The External Dimension

5.2.3.1 Attractiveness

5.2.3.1.1 The current status

The European Union is currently the largest economy in the world with access to 500 million consumers and a GDP per head of 25.000 Euros. Even though economic growth is projected to be slow in the near to mid-term future, it is still the largest trading block.

The size of the European economy and the comparatively high purchasing power, open markets (including the service industry), and relatively low tariffs make the EU an attractive trading partner. The EU is the world’s largest trader of manufactured goods and services and is first in inbound and outbound international investments. The EU already ranks as the top trading partner for 80 countries worldwide, and is particularly open towards trade with developing countries. Hence, the EU is an attractive trading partner for countries and other trading blocks around the world (EC, no date, De Bièvre, 2018).

Despite the international trend towards closing off markets from international competition, the EU has still a number of trade agreements under negotiation. The EU is committed to promoting free trade and international cooperation in the future. EU states this in its strategy on trade “Trade for All” (EC, 2015), although more emphasis should be put on European values, transparency, and effectiveness when negotiating new trade agreements.

5.2.3.1.2 Implications for measuring “attractiveness”

5.2.3.1.2.1 Changes over time

However, the attractiveness of the EU with regard to trade is likely to depend on both, the economic development of the EU and its reliability as a negotiation partner, which can both change over time:

Firstly, when the UK leaves the EU, the market size of the EU will diminish. If that also means, that the negotiation powers of the EU will diminish remains to be seen. Even with the UK leaving the EU, the European single market will remain one of the biggest markets worldwide. Together
with its trade policy priorities of promoting free trade and its openness towards developing countries, it is likely that the EU will remain an attractive actor in the future.

Secondly, the example of TTIP and CETA showed, that it is possible that trade negotiations that lasted for years are in vain, if not all MS (and potentially even regional groups in one MS) oppose the outcome. The EU has already reacted to this possibility. In the case of the EU-Japan trade negotiations, two agreements were concluded – a trade agreement that needed to be ratified only in the EU institutions, and a trade partnership agreement that has to be ratified by all MS additionally.

5.2.3.1.2.2 Relation to other dimensions of EU actorness

Attractiveness – in the case of trade policy – seems to depend highly on economic developments and the opportunities for expanding business within the EU or for investments from the EU in the respective partner country. This factor is relatively independent from the other actorness dimensions. However, as shown above, also trust in the EU is an important aspect that can increase or decrease the attractiveness of the EU as a negotiator.

5.2.3.2 Recognition of the EU as a negotiator

5.2.3.2.1 The current status

As the EU is one of the biggest economic zones worldwide and the MS cannot negotiate individual agreements themselves. Hence, other international actors have accepted the EU as their only legitimate negotiation partner in trade matters. The EU’s membership in the WTO further strengthens the EU’s position as an internationally recognized actor in trade policy.

A question regarding the recognition of the European Commission as a valued negotiation partner arose after the failing of the TTIP agreement. Speculations arose that the EU may become a less attractive negotiation partner, if agreements negotiated over long periods of time that cost many resources, cannot be adopted in the end, because the MS do not accept the results of the negotiation process. The risk, that a trade agreement fails if it needs to be ratified in all MS (and possibly also in regional parliaments or through referenda), rises considerably. However so far, there have been no other negotiation processes, that verified that this is a serious concern.

However, recently the US approached individual MS with requests to negotiate trade agreements directly. These requests were immediately declined with reference to the European Commission as the only legitimate negotiation partner in this matter. It remains to be seen whether these attempts were just based on a misunderstanding of the legal arrangements regarding trade policy within the EU or whether this indicates a loss in reputation of the EU in negotiating trade agreements.
5.2.3.2.2 Implications for measuring “the recognition of the EU as a negotiator”

5.2.3.2.2.1 Changes over time
As the European Commission has the legal power to handle trade related questions on behalf of the MS since a long time, changes in the perception of the European Commission as a legitimate negotiation partner can hardly be observed. However, the recent attempts of the US to directly address individual MS in trade related matters may be a sign that there is the possibility that the European Commission as a negotiator is questioned by international actors.

The recent controversial discussion within the EU and the MS regarding trade agreements such as CETA and TTIP may result in a loss of trust in the EU’s power to convince and satisfy the MS demands with regards to trade policies. However, there is no evidence so far, that this is a relevant development.

5.2.3.2.2.2 Relation to other dimensions of EU actorness
As mentioned above, the recognition of the EU in general – or the European Commission in particular – depends on the trust of other actors in the EU’s capabilities to convince the MS and to implement the negotiated agreements, which in turn is more easily achievable if the policy preferences of the MS align. Therefore, there is also a connection to the dimension of cohesion.

5.2.3.3 Opportunity to act / Necessity to act

5.2.3.3.1 The current status
Creating one of the biggest markets in the world was one of the main motivations to establish the common commercial policy and to bundle the resources for negotiating trade agreements at EU level. This was a response to the international competition and is still relevant in the light of the growing competition on the world markets such as China or the other BRICS countries. Acting as a single trading block increased the power of the European Commission to negotiate more favourable conditions within the trade agreements than the single MS would have been able to do. Moreover, joint action saves resources, as only a single complex agreement has to be negotiated instead of 28.

As the market power of other actors is growing in the international arena is growing, this necessity to present the EU as a unitary actor remains relevant. As currently on-going trade negotiations show, the EU still has the opportunity to advance and expand the EU trade policies. However, political discussions are shifting towards more protectionist views on trade. This becomes evident in the shift in the US policy priorities, for example. This trend diminishes the opportunities for the EU.

5.2.3.3.2 Implications for measuring “the necessity/ opportunities to act”

5.2.3.3.2.1 Changes over time
The MS highly value the advantages of negotiating trade policies as a unified actor, and did not question the EU’s competences in this regard over the last decades. However, the discussions
surrounding the Brexit debate showed, that the UK, for example, does not consider negotiating trade agreements jointly a major advantage compared to bilateral agreements anymore. This not the reason why the UK is planning to leave the EU. However, the trade opportunities provided by the EU are not valued as highly as in other MS. Hence, we can observe changes in the perception of the advantages of acting jointly in the context of trade policy.

More importantly, the international arena evolves over time as well. New players emerge or expand their influence in international trade policies, new products and services are being developed, and therefore, new trade policies are needed to respond to these constantly changing framework conditions. On the one hand, new policies are required to protect European businesses and consumers, but also new trade agreements provide the opportunity to expand European trade in the globalized economy. These opportunities to act also depend on the international negotiation partners, and their evaluation of the costs and benefits of trade arrangements with the EU.

Therefore, the opportunities to act depend not only on internal developments within the EU but largely depend on the international economic developments and the set policy priorities of potential trade partners.

5.2.3.3.2 Relation to other dimensions of EU actorness

First, the observed changes over time strongly correlate with the evaluation of the EU’s attractiveness. It depends on the other actors in the international system whether they rank trade with the EU as a priority or if they prefer other commercial block or countries as more valuable partners or if they prefer more protectionist international commercial policies in general, so that expanding trade relations is not a political priority.

Second, the opportunities to act also result from the recognition of the EU as a a valuable and trustworthy negotiation partner. If the EU does not meet these criteria, potential trading partners may refrain from negotiating with the EU.

6. Conclusion

The literature review has shown that for determining actorness both structural as well as agential factors influence actorness. A model for evaluating actorness and effectiveness, therefore, needs to take into account both. Hence, we analyzed the literature on actorness, and effectiveness. In addition, we look at current trends in global governance, that can influence the EU’s actorness on structural level. Our model for actorness reflects these findings and is depicted in figure 2.

To test whether this model is suitable for analyzing actorness and effectiveness of the EU in different policy fields, we conducted with a first case study on trade policy assuming that the EU does have a high degree of actorness in this policy area. We then described the EU’s role in this context for each of the actorness dimensions in the model.
We found that the model is comprehensive and covers the relevant dimensions of actorness and effectiveness. Also, a change over time was observable applying this set of variables. However, it became also clear that the model is rather complex. Not only are there many different aspects to consider that influence the degree of actorness and the level of effectiveness. Moreover, the actorness dimensions are not entirely independent from each other.

We argue, as also Rhinhard and Sjöstedt (2019) have concluded, that the legal competences of the EU (authority dimension) and the dimension of coherence stand out as they both also influence other dimensions of actorness. This needs to be reflected in the actorness model and has to be considered in the operationalization of the concept. Therefore, it is the aim for the next step in the project to operationalize the dimensions of actorness taking into account the intertwined nature of the dimensions.

Secondly, we will conduct further case studies, which serve as both, a preparation for the Deep Dives and further input for the model. We aim at complementing the model and test, whether the lessons learnt from the case study on trade apply to other policy areas, which other aspects have to be added, and to refine the model as a basis for operationalizing actorness and effectiveness for the AGGREGATOR database.
7. Literature


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